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n economics as in anthropology, old artifacts spur continuing debates. A
case in point is Knut Wicksell’s celebrated 1898 analysis of the cumula-
tive process of price inﬂation in pure credit, cashless economies. Some
economists viewWicksell’s model as a milestone in the evolution of quantity-
theoretic monetary analysis inasmuch as it constitutes the seminal rigorous
explanation of how loan-created stocks of bank money translate interest rate
differentials into price level changes. Others, however, dispute this point and
instead argue that money plays no role in determining price level changes in
Wicksell’s model.
Unfortunately, Wicksell’s own writings do little to resolve the debate.
Ambiguous in the extreme as to whether the cashless society version of the
cumulativeprocesshasquantity-theoreticroots, hiswritingssupportquantity-
and anti-quantity theory interpretations alike.
One person who could have resolved the debate was Wicksell’s country-
man and contemporary, the Swedish economist Gustav Cassel. In a 1928
journal article Cassel provided an extremely clear, compelling articulation of
the quantity-theoretic foundations of the cumulative process. He then demon-
stratedthefar-reachingsigniﬁcanceofthatarticulationbyextendingittomore
generalized considerations, including an analysis of the business cycle and
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alternative monetary policy rules. While Wicksell conducted monetary pol-
icy analysis using a model without money, Cassel showed that money plays
a crucial, behind-the-scenes role even when excluded as a variable from the
constituent equations of policy models and policy rules.
Cassel’s demonstration should have made it clear that the quantity theory
interpretation of the cumulative process and the operation of policy rules was
correct and the anti-quantity theory interpretation was suspect. But that did
not happen. Instead, Wicksell’s Swedish followers largely overlooked Cas-
sel’s demonstration, perhaps because it was conﬁned to a single published
article in a foreign journal they did not ordinarily read. For whatever rea-
son, Cassel’s explanation exerted little inﬂuence and did nothing to prevent
the ﬂourishing of anti-quantity theoretic interpretations of Wicksell’s work
from the 1920s through the 1980s. The situation is different now. Cassel’s
rediscovered insights locate Wicksell’s pure credit analysis of the cumulative
process squarely in the quantity theory tradition. And, by stating that schema
in its most precise, transparent form—not to mention extending its range of
application—theyspotlighttheprescience,originality,andinventivenessofits
creator, conﬁrming Wicksell’s place in the front rank of monetary theorists.
Wicksell’s Three Contributions
Knut Wicksell’s claim to fame as a monetary theorist rests on three contribu-
tions presented in his 1898 Interest and Prices and volume two of his 1906
Lectures on Political Economy. First is his concept of the hypothetical pure
credit economy, or cashless society. In this regime all hard, or outside, money
(gold coin and convertible paper currency) ceases to exist, the banking sys-
tem consists of a single central bank that holds no reserves, and the medium
of exchange is composed entirely of inside money, that is, checking deposits
created by the central bank when it makes loans. With no reserve constraint to
anchor nominal variables in the pure credit regime, deposit supply possesses
potentially unlimited elasticity and the price level theoretically can rise (or
fall) forever. It is the job of the central bank to prevent this outcome by means
ofitsrate-settingpolicy. Suchpolicyreplacesthemissingreserveconstraintin
imposing determinacy on an otherwise indeterminate money stock and price
level.
SecondisWicksell’sfamousanalysisofthecumulativeprocessaccording
to which price level movements stem from the differential between natural
(equilibrium) and market (loan) rates of interest and continue as long as the
differential persists. The rate differential is of key importance to Wicksell. It
generates a gap between new capital investment and household saving, a gap
that manifests itself in the form of an excess aggregate demand for goods that
bids up prices cumulatively until the differential vanishes.T. M. Humphrey: Wicksell and Cassel 61
Wicksell’s third contribution is his celebrated feedback policy rule, under
which the central bank stabilizes the price level by adjusting its interest rate
in response to price level deviations from target, stopping only when prices
converge to target. A precursor of the modern Taylor rule, Wicksell’s rule is




of these pioneering constructs. Agreement ends, however, on the role that
Wicksellintendedforchangesinthequantityofdepositmoneytoplayinthese
constructs. Do bank money stock changes play an active, causal role in the
transmission mechanism connecting rate differentials to price level changes?
Or do they occur passively as a consequence of price level changes produced
by nonmonetary means? In short, is bank money a price-determining or a
price-determined variable in the workings of the cumulative process and the
policy rule? Does causation run from deposits to prices as the quantity theory
of money predicts? Or does it run from prices to deposit money, contrary to
the quantity theory?
Active Money View
One group of scholars, including Arthur Marget (1938), Johan Myhrman
(1991), Don Patinkin (1965), and Hans-Michael Trautwein (1996), contend
that Wicksell saw endogenous (that is, responding to other variables in the
model) changes in the stock of bank money as playing a crucial causal role.
They argue that for him changes in the quantity of deposits constitute the
necessary connecting link between the natural rate–market rate differential
and the resulting rise in the price level. In their view, Wicksell understood
that such money stock changes transform the interest differential and its as-
sociated investment-saving gap into the excess aggregate demand that bids
up prices. They claim that without this monetary expansion to mediate and
ﬁnance the excess demand, there would be no inﬂationary pressure and the
rate differential would be abortive in inﬂuencing prices.
Patinkin explains how an excess of the natural over the market rate in
Wicksell’s pure credit economy engenders proﬁt opportunities for investors
and leads them to “increase their bank borrowings. The new demand de-
posits...placed at their disposal will enable them to increase their ‘demand
for goods and services as well as for raw materials already in the market for
futureproduction’”therebyraisingprices(1965, 589–90). “Byincreasingthe
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level by maintaining a discrepancy between the market and real [natural] rates
until the desired price level is reached, and then equalizing the rates at that
point” (594). Rate differential determines deposit growth, which in turn de-
termines price level change.
Margetrepeatedlymakesexactlythesamepoint(1938,179–86,especially
184–85), arguing, for example, that the level “of general prices depends upon
the total amount of bank money issued,” which, “in turn, depends upon the
relation of bank rate to natural rate” (263). He likewise voices the related
point that Wicksell saw adjustments in the central bank’s loan rate of interest
as working through money stock changes to stabilize prices in the feedback
policy rule. Loan rate changes lead to corresponding changes in the demand
for and supply of bank loans. More importantly, such rate changes lead to
changesinthestockofdepositmoneycreatedasabyproductoftheloans. This
monetarychangeinturnmovesprices. Here, then, weﬁndthequantitytheory
proposition that although the interest rate differential determines changes in
the stock of bank money, those money stock changes must precede and cause
the resulting price level movements. Myhrman’s summary of the quantity
theory interpretation is apt: Wicksell “explained the role of...inside money
and the rate of interest in the transmission of monetary impulses to the price
level [showing that] causation runs from the monetary system to the price
level” (1991, 272).
Passive Money View
In contrast to Marget, Myhrman, Patinkin, and Trautwein, however, other
prominentWicksell scholars, notably Trygve Haavelmo (1978), J¨ urg Niehans
(1990), andAxel Leijonhufvud (1981), deny that changes in the stock of bank
money play a crucial, price-determining role in Wicksell’s cumulative pro-
cess. In their interpretation, Wicksell held that interest rate differentials and
the resulting excess aggregate demand drive up prices directly without the
necessary intervention of bank money creation. Instead, bank money expan-
sion comes at the end of each stage of the cumulative process and only then to
accommodate, or validate, price increases already produced by nonmonetary
forces. As Haavelmo puts it, rate-created “excess [aggregate] demand is the
primary force, which inﬂates the value of PX[nominal output]” (1978, 214).
Afterwards, the stock of loan-created bank money moves “along passively in
order to cover the public’s [monetary] requirements, which in turn depend on
PX” (214).
Inshort,accordingtoHaavelmothebehaviorofbankmoneyinWicksell’s
cumulative process is best described by the Banking Principle, according to
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the quantity of [bank] money plays a...passive role; it adjusts in accor-
dance with the [monetary] requirements created by changes in the value
of transactions when the price level is forced up or down by other factors.
(1978, 210)
Niehans explicitly endorses Haavelmo’s passive-money interpretation.
He asserts that in “Wicksell’s approach” the supply of bank money, far from
playing an active, price-determining role, instead “adjusts passively to what-
everhouseholdsandﬁrmsdemand”atgivenprices(1990,275). Leijonhufvud
agrees. He writes that “the excess demand for commodities” rather than “ac-
celeration in the growth rate of ‘money’” is what “drive[s] the price-level
up” (1981, 159–60). It follows that “watching ‘M’ ...would not be of much
help in forming rational expectations. In a world like Wicksell’s, the money
stock would be a lagging indicator. The growth rate of M is not driving the
cumulative process” (159–60).
Leijonhufvud, Niehans, and Haavelmo are far from the ﬁrst to claim that
Wicksell’s cumulative process consists of a transmission mechanism with
links running unidirectionally from aggregate demand to prices and thence
to money demand and supply. Earlier interpreters claimed to ﬁnd this same
mechanism in which bank money appears at the tail end of the causal queue.
Thus William P. Yohe quotes a 1908 statement by one S. F. Altman alleging
thatWicksell “believes that the [money] holding follows the price movement,
which takes place through stronger purchase or sale of goods” (1959, 144,
n. 67). Small wonder that Hugo Hegeland observed that “Knut Wicksell has
provoked more discussion as to whether he was a opponent or adherent of the
quantity theory than perhaps any other economist” (1951, 133).
Five Contentions
In an effort to resolve the controversy over the active money versus passive
money interpretations of Wicksell, this article argues ﬁve points. First, pro-
ponents of the quantity theory interpretation may perhaps possess the correct
analysis of the cumulative process and the operation of the feedback rule,
namelythatchangesinthestockofbankmoneymustprecedeandinduceprice
levelchanges. Second, thoseproponents, theirclaimstothecontrarynotwith-
standing, cannot consistently and unambiguously ﬁnd that interpretation in
Wicksell,whoattimesseemstosidewiththepassivemoneyview. ThatWick-
sell’sformulationcouldspawntwopolaroppositeviews—onemonetarist, the
other antimonetarist—is not surprising given its ambiguities, inconsistencies,
and peculiarities of phrasing and deﬁnition.
Third, for the quantity-theoretic version of the cumulative process and the
policy rule, one must go not to Wicksell but rather to Cassel, his rival for the
professorship at Lund, who presented that version in a remarkable but under-
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of Prices” and published in the August 1928 issue of the Quarterly Journal
of Economics. The article is especially noteworthy because it challenges the
widespread view that Cassel adhered to a simple monetary model that ex-
cluded interest rates and had the path of the price level determined solely by
the differential growth rates of the nominal supply of and real demand for
monetary gold (see Jonung [1979]). True, Cassel used that simple model in
much of his empirical work as reported in his famous textbook The Theory of
Social Economy. But his QJE piece shows that, in at least one key theoretical
essay, he employed a Wicksellian framework that incorporated natural and
market rates of interest as well as an endogenous stock of inside, loan-created
money to determine the price level.1
The fourth contention of this article is that Cassel’s active-money expo-
sition of the cumulative process contains innovations that advance it beyond
Wicksell’s exposition. Cassel, like Wicksell, uses the cumulative process
model to derive a stabilizing policy rule, but unlike Wicksell, he extends it to
the analysis of the business cycle and alternative proposed monetary norms
as well. With respect to the business cycle, he applies the cumulative process
to show that monetary factors amplify real ﬂuctuations. In other words, he
broadens the scope of application of the cumulative process analysis beyond
theconﬁnesimposedbyWicksell. Insodoing, hedemonstratestheversatility
and explanatory power of the quantity theory.
Fifth, on one matter at least, namely the analysis of the operation of the
price-stabilizing feedback policy rule, Cassel’s discussion lacks the precision
of Wicksell’s. Wicksell not only speciﬁed the exact indicator to which the
central bank responds but also described the behavior of the time path of the
pricelevelwhenitisconstrainedorinﬂuencedbythepolicyrule. Nevertheless,
Cassel more than Wicksell saw that quantity-theoretic logic underlay their
policy rules.
1. QUANTITY THEORY INTERPRETATION
Proponents of the quantity theory interpretation of Wicksell’s work generally
attribute to him a version of the cumulative process model describable by ﬁve
relationshipsshownbelow. Theserelationshipsaremeanttodepictthecaseof
Wicksell’spurecrediteconomyinwhich(i)allsavingS isdepositedinbanks,
1 Cassel’s article is noteworthy also because it runs counter to Bo Gustafsson’s contention
that Cassel’s “expositions are not seldom marred by contradictions and a vagueness in expression,
only scantily veiled by his mastery of round and polished sentences” (1987, 375). Contrary to
that verdict, Cassel’s exposition of the cumulative process in his QJE article is among the clearest
and most succinct to be found in the literature on Wicksell. The mystery is why the Swedish
successors of Wicksell and Cassel ignored this article. Had they read and cited it, the subsequent
anti-quantity theory interpretation of the cumulative process might never have appeared, or at least
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(ii) all investment I is bank-ﬁnanced, (iii) the economy is closed such that all
saving and investment are of domestic origin, (iv) banks lend solely to ﬁnance
investment, (v) full employment prevails such that shifts in aggregate demand
affect prices but not real output, which remains at its capacity level, and (vi)
agents,alwaysexpectingcurrentpricestoprevailinthefuture,anticipatenone
of the price changes that occur.
Embodying the foregoing assumptions, the ﬁve relationships are capable
of depicting steady state equilibrium as well as the dynamic disequilibrium
adjustment process triggered by disturbances to equilibrium. The steady state
solution obtains when the relationships are set equal to zero, resulting in the
celebrated conditions ofWicksellian monetary equilibrium. These conditions
are market rate of interest equals natural rate, saving equals investment, ag-
gregate demand equals aggregate supply both in real and nominal terms, and
the stock of bank money and the price level are stable and unchanging.
Now, a modern general equilibrium theorist, schooled in the notion that
self-corrective forces operate with sufﬁcient swiftness to maintain model
economiesinequilibrium,wouldsolvetheequationsfortheirabove-mentioned
steady state values. He or she would further treat dynamics not as disequi-
librium processes, but rather as equilibrium paths driven by moving state
variables. Not soWicksell. Believing that persistent departures from equilib-
rium were commonplace, he had more ambitious plans for his model. To him
and many of his interpreters, the baseline conditions of monetary equilibrium
merely set the stage for the cumulative disequilibrium process, which begins
when the natural rate diverges from the market rate (see Trautwein [1996],
31–32). Wicksell attributed such divergences to a multitude of real shocks
that disturb the natural rate while the inertial forces of habit, routine, and ab-
sence of base-money reserve constraints in the pure credit economy introduce
sluggishness into bankers’ adjustment of the market rate. In the pure credit
economy, central bankers theoretically could hold the market rate—which in
pure cash and mixed cash-credit economies tends to converge to the natural
rate—below or above that latter rate forever.
Let the resulting natural-market rate divergence activate the cumulative
process. Immediately the relationships shed their zero equilibrium steady
state solutions to depict dynamic disequilibrium responses and adaptations.
Shown below, the relationships in their dynamic setting treat causality as
running unidirectionally from the independent variables on the right side of
eachequationtothedependentvariablesontheleft. True, themoderntheorist
versed in formal equilibrium analysis may question this mode of reasoning.
Accustomed to thinking in terms of a system of equations simultaneously
satisﬁed by a set of variables, he or she would argue that it makes no sense to
think of one variable adjusting ﬁrst and thus causing another to adjust, and so
on. Nevertheless, itisjustthissortofchainofcausationthatliesattheheartof
Wicksell’sinﬂationmechanismandoftheactiveversuspassivemoneydebate.66 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
And it is just this sort of chain that the following relationships describe:
I − S = a(r − i), (1)
dM/dt = I − S, (2)
X = dM/dt, (3)
E = X, (4)
and
dP/dt = bE. (5)
Equation (1) says that because lower market interest rates i encourage
capital formation and discourage thrift, the planned investment expenditure I
of business ﬁrms exceeds the planned voluntary saving S of households when
the natural rate of interest r (the rate that equilibrates saving and investment)
exceeds the lagging market rate i set by the banking system.2 Here the coef-
ﬁcient a is the parameter that relates the investment-saving gap to the interest
rate differential that generates it.
Equation (2) states that the gap, or excess of desired investment over de-
siredsaving,equalstheadditionalmoneydM/dt newlycreatedasabyproduct
of the loans made to ﬁnance the gap. In other words, since the central bank
(the only bank in the pure credit economy) creates new check-deposit money
by way of loan, monetary expansion occurs when it lends more funds to busi-
ness investors than it receives on deposit from savers (who Wicksell assumes
lodge all their savings with the bank). Equation (2) admits of a simple deriva-
tion. Denote business demands for bank loans LD as LD = I(i),where I(i)
is the schedule relating desired investment spending (assumed to be entirely
ﬁnanced by bank loans) with the loan rate of interest, or cost of borrowing,
i. Similarly, denote bank loan supply LS as the sum of household saving S
deposited with banks plus new money dM/dt created by banks in accommo-
dating loan demands. In short, LS = S(i) + dM/dt. Equating loan supply
and loan demand LS = LD (where the causal arrow runs from right to left
2A lower market rate stimulates planned investment by raising the present discounted value of
the stream of expected future returns to capital. The rise in this discounted revenue stream raises
the price of capital goods above their replacement cost and makes it proﬁtable to produce more of
them. Furthermore, since the market rate is the intertemporal relative price of consumption today
in terms of consumption sacriﬁced tomorrow, a fall in that price induces people to take more
of consumption today. Consumption rises and saving falls, hence the shortfall of saving below
investment at lower than natural interest rates.T. M. Humphrey: Wicksell and Cassel 67
since loan supply passively accommodates itself to loan demand) and solving
for the gap between investment and saving yields equation (2).
Equation(3)isabsolutelyessentialtothequantitytheoryinterpretation. It
recognizesthatwhilethequantityofbankloansinanaccommodativebanking
system is passively demand determined and can never be in excess supply, the
same cannot be said for the stock of money created as a byproduct of the
loans. On the contrary, such a loan-created money stock can, as long as
nominal transactions and thus the public’s demand for transaction balances
remains momentarily unchanged, indeed be redundant, or overissued. Thus
equation (3) says that because at prevailing prices P and real output Q the
public’sdemandformoneyMD asexpressedbytheequationMD = kPQhas
not yet changed, the new money dM/dt created by loan constitutes an excess
supply of money X.3 This undesired excess money supply is essential to the
operation of the cumulative process because without it moneyholders would
have no incentive to spend the additional money away. And with no incentive
tospenditaway, therewouldbenoforcetopropelpricesupward. Instead, the
new money would be willingly held and absorbed into transaction balances
and thus could never spur spending and prices.
Accordingly, equation (4) says that cashholders attempt to rid themselves
oftheexcessmoneyX byspendingitongoodsandservices. Theresultisthat
the surplus money spills over into the commodity market to underwrite and
mediatetheexcessaggregatedemandforgoodsE impliedbythegapbetween
investment and saving. Indeed, the expenditure of the excess money is what
transforms the excess desired, intended demand implicit in the investment-
savinggapintoexcesseffective,actualdemand. Insum,equation(4)embodies
Walras’sLawaccordingtowhichanexcessdemandforgoodsmustbematched
by a corresponding excess supply of something else, which quantity theorists
take to be money.
Accordingtoequation(5),becauseWicksellassumedthatoutputisalways
at its full capacity level and so cannot expand, the excess effective demand E
must exhaust its force in bidding up prices, which rise by an amount dP/dt
proportionaltotheexcessdemand,withthecoefﬁcientbdenotingthefactorof
proportionality. Substituting equations (1)–(4) into (5) and (1) into (2) yields
the two equations
dP/dt = ab(r − i) (6)
and
dM/dt = a(r − i), (7)
3 The money demand function MD = kPQ is the famous Marshall-Pigou (or Cambridge)
cash-balance equation, in which the parameter k denotes the fraction of nominal income PQ that
people desire to hold in the form of money balances M. Continental European quantity theorists
already were beginning to employ this function, often in verbal rather than symbolic form, in
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which together state that price inﬂation and the money growth that underlies
and permits it stem from discrepancies between the natural and market rates
of interest. Further substitution of equation (7) into equation (6) yields the
expression
dP/dt = b(dM/dt), (8)
with causation running as always from right to left. Per this quantity theory
interpretation, bank monetary expansion dM/dt is the necessary link that
translates interest differentials into price level changes dP/dt in Wicksell’s
cumulative process.
2. ANTI-QUANTITY THEORY INTERPRETATION
By contrast, proponents of the passive-money interpretation who claimWick-
sell as an adherent drop equations (2), (3), and (4) and have excess aggregate
demand E itself (which they deﬁne as identical to the investment-saving gap)
directly determine the price level change according to the three-equation sys-
tem in which money is conspicuously absent:
I − S = a(r − i), (9)
E = I − S, (10)
and
dP/dt = bE. (11)
In the passive-money interpretation, money stock changes, far from being
the active intervening element that transforms interest differentials into price
level changes, adapt passively to support the price changes already produced
by excess aggregate demand. That is, assuming (i) that purchasers demand
loansLD frombanksinordertobeabletobuythesamerealquantityofgoods
Q at the raised prices dP/dt, (ii) that banks accommodate these borrowers
by supplying new loans LS in the form of bank money creation dM/dt, and
(iii) that money circulates against goods with a given turnover velocity V, one
obtains
LD = (Q/V)dP/dt, (12)
LS = dM/dt, (13)
and
LS = LD, (14)T. M. Humphrey: Wicksell and Cassel 69
which upon substitution yields
dM/dt = (Q/V)dP/dt, (15)
withcausationrunningfrompricelevelchangesdP/dt tomoneystockchanges
dM/dt.
In short, with the money stock adjusting passively to changes in the price
levelcomponentofthemoneydemandfunction,therecanbenoexcessmoney
supply. And without an excess supply of money, there is nothing to induce
moneyholders to attempt to rid themselves of it by spending it away. No
redundantmoneyexiststospilloverintothecommoditymarketintheformof
an excess demand for goods to bid up prices. On the contrary, far from over-
or underissue forcing a change in prices, money supply conforms to money
demand with neither excess nor deﬁciency and causality runs from prices to
money in the passive money view. Here is an interpretation stemming from
Wicksell’s own analysis that is antithetical to what quantity theorists claim he
sought to accomplish.
3. WICKSELL’S OWN VIEW
Quantity theorists may be right in contending that Wicksell, in Hans-Michael
Trautwein’s words, “wanted to demonstrate that the quantity theory of money
isvalidevenintheextreme[purecrediteconomy]caseofmoneysupplyendo-
geneity” (1996, 31). Still, it is difﬁcult if not impossible to prove Trautwein’s
propositionconclusivelyfromarepresentativesampleofWicksell’sownwrit-
ings. It is no wonder that quantity and anti-quantity theorists alike can claim
Wicksellasanally. Insomepassages,heindeedsideswiththequantitytheory,
holding that bank money expansion is the crucial link connecting rate differ-
entialstopricelevelchangesandtransformingexanteinvestment-savinggaps
into ex post excess aggregate demand. In his 1898 article “Inﬂuence of the
Rate of Interest on Commodity Prices,” Wicksell speaks of prices adapting
“themselves to the increase in the amount of money,” implying that monetary
expansion occurs before prices can change (80). Again, in volume two of his
Lectures on Political Economy he implies money-to-price causality when he
writes “of the inﬂuence of credit [demand deposits] on prices” (1906, 164).
Passive Money and Reverse Causality
In other passages, however, Wicksell unambiguously sides with the passive-
money view. Asserting reverse causality, he writes in his 1925 piece “The
Monetary Problem of the Scandinavian Countries” that monetary expansion
may occur after rather than before prices have increased. Speciﬁcally, he
argues that spenders themselves can directly raise nominal national income
simply by bidding up all prices (accomplished through a temporary rise in70 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
velocity) and subsequently borrowing from the banking system to cover the
increased monetary requirement. Describing a pure credit economy in which
“all payments were made on a cheque basis,” he says that whereas deposit
checking accounts
would constantly increase in amount as prices rose, at ﬁrst...there would
be no increase in the average amount or in the aggregate of these
accounts. In the course of time they would become inconveniently small
in proportion to the increased volume of monetary payments [required
to buy the national product valued at the higher prices]. They would
consequently need to be adjusted upwards. In the ﬁnal analysis this
presupposes an increase in bank credit. [In this manner] as prices rose,
bank deposits and bank loans would swell more or less automatically.
(1925, 202, emphasis added)
ThecausalandtemporalsequencehererunsfrompricesP toloansLtomoney
M with M adapting itself passively to prior changes in P.
Again, in still another passage asserting reverse causality,Wicksell writes
that “a general rise in prices will cause banks of issue to increase their issue
of notes” and that even if the “banks ﬂatly refuse to expand their circulation”
they cannot “prevent the rise [of prices] or force prices down”—those prices
obeying nonmonetary imperatives (202). It is on the basis of these passages
that Bertil Ohlin, in his introduction to the English translation of Interest
and Prices, claims that Wicksell believed that “a general rise in prices may
wellcomeaboutbecauseconsumersincreasetheirdemand...forconsumption
goods. This...neednothaveanythingtodowithtoolargecreditstoproducers.
The conclusion to be drawn...is that...prices may rise or fall ad libitum”
(1936, xx–xxi). In short, Wicksell provides ammunition for quantity and
anti-quantity theory forces alike.
Application of Real Balance Mechanics to Outside
Money
Wicksell’s inconsistency is most apparent in his contradictory treatment of an
excess supply of outside versus inside money. In the case of outside money—
goldcoinandconvertiblecurrency—herecognizedthatsuchanexcessmoney
supply indeed could occur in pure cash and mixed cash-credit regimes and
thenspilloverintothecommoditymarketintheformofanexcessdemandfor
goods that drives up prices. In perhaps the best description of the operation
of a real balance effect in the neoclassical monetary literature, he explained
([1898] 1965, 39–40) how a rise in M (or a random fall in P) would cause
actual cash balances to become greater than desired. He then described howT. M. Humphrey: Wicksell and Cassel 71
cashholders,inanefforttoworkofftheseundesiredbalances,wouldspendthe
excess money on goods until prices rose sufﬁciently to render actual balances
equal to desired ones.




deposit money is already implicit in his tendency to deﬁne deposits and loans
indiscriminately as credit. With this deﬁnition, he conﬂated a non-demand-
determined variable (deposits) with a demand-determined one (loans). Treat-
ing both identically, he failed to see that deposits could be in excess supply
even if loans—passively provided upon demand by a pliant, accommodative
banking system—were not. As far as deposits were concerned, he argued
that their quantity (like that of loans) is always demand determined. Fur-
ther, he contended that deposit supply and demand are identical at all prices,
such that both the price level and the nominal quantity of deposit money are
indeterminate in the pure credit economy. In his words,
We have seen that in our ideal state [the pure credit economy] every
payment, and consequently every loan, is accomplished by means of
cheques or giro facilities. It is then no longer possible to refer to the
supply of money as an independent magnitude, differing from the demand
for money. No matter what amount of money may be demanded from
the banks, that is the amount which they are in a position to lend....The
banks have merely to enter a ﬁgure in the borrower’s account to represent
a credit granted or a deposit created. When a cheque is then drawn and
subsequently presented to the banks, they credit the account of the owner
of the cheque with a deposit of the appropriate amount (or reduce his
debit by that amount). The “supply of money” is thus furnished by the
demand itself. (1898, 110, emphasis added)
If Wicksell’s conclusion is correct, it follows that bank money can never
be in excess supply. And if it can never be in excess supply, it cannot induce
holders to attempt to rid themselves of it by spending it away. And if it is not
spent away, it cannot be the force that generates an excess demand for goods
and bids up the price level. One has to question, therefore, quantity theorists’
wisdom in attributing equations (3) and (4) to Wicksell.
In short, with bank money completely demand determined, there can be
no real balance effects of the kind that Wicksell applied to coin and currency
in his treatment of pure cash and mixed cash-credit economies. Bank money,
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Laidler’s summary judgment: “There is no logical reason whyWicksell could
nothave”acknowledgedthatthepublic’sdemandforexchangemedia“would
tend to give bank deposits the same role in the credit economy as currency
in the cash economy: and then to note that deposits generated as a byproduct
of credit creation would have, by way of cash balance mechanics, their own
inﬂuence on the economy,” that is, on the price level (1991, 148). “He did
not take these steps, however” (148). His failure to do so would deprive
his pure-credit-economy version of the cumulative process of quantity theory
foundations and render it susceptible to anti-quantity theory interpretations.4
4. CASSEL’S QUANTITY-THEORETIC VERSION OF THE
CUMULATIVE PROCESS
For a straightforward, consistent account of the quantity theory version of the
cumulativeprocessandfeedbackpolicyruleonemustlooknottoWicksellbut
rather to the work of his compatriot and sometime rival Gustav Cassel. In his
1928QuarterlyJournalofEconomicsarticle,Cassel,withoutoncementioning
Wicksell’s name,5 developed the cumulative process analysis for the case of
a loan-created inconvertible banknote money administered by a central bank,
whichCasseltreatsastheonlybankintheeconomy.6 Themonetaryregimehe
4 In contrast to the position taken above, a modern equilibrium theorist might ﬁnd Wicksell’s
ambiguity commendable. He or she would argue as follows: First, one cannot rely on a full,
or complete, general equilibrium analysis of Wicksell’s model economy since the maintained as-
sumption is that the bank rate is exogenously ﬁxed for a time below its natural equilibrium level.
Second, given this assumption, the proper method of analysis is to ask what the consistency condi-
tions arising from market clearing and individual optimization imply about the remaining variables,
money and prices in particular. These conditions imply that the stock of money and the price level
both must rise. But nothing in the pure logic of Wicksell’s abstract economy requires that the
rising of one variable must be causally or temporally prior to the rising of the other. Therefore,
Wicksell was right to leave the matter ambiguous. If so, then the whole active-versus-passive-
money debate reduces to much ado about nothing. The fact remains, however, that the debate,
pointless or not, has raged for almost one hundred years.
5 Despite Cassel’s failure to cite Wicksell, he was clearly polishing and perfecting the latter’s
model.
6 Cassel’s article exempliﬁes the tendency of scientiﬁc integrity to prevail over personal ani-
mosity in rigorous disciplines such as economics. It is no secret that Wicksell and Cassel disliked
each other and frequently disagreed on issues other than the goal of price stability (Seligman 1962,
562; Blaug 1986, 43). Enmity between the two surfaced during their competition for the professor-
ship at Lund when Wicksell advised Cassel to withdraw his application and disparaged his capital
theory as the work of a rank amateur (Gardlund 1958, 321–22). Later, in correspondence, Wick-
sell complained of Cassel’s arrogance, his overweening self-esteem, his pretensions to originality,
and his notorious failure to cite predecessors and contemporaries whose ideas he used (Gardlund
1958, 322). Wicksell was, in his own words, put off by Cassel’s habit of “incessantly singing his
own praises, appointing himself generalissimus over the rest of us poor creatures” (322). Mutual
antagonism intensiﬁed in 1919 when Wicksell published a devastating critique of Cassel’s Theory
of Social Economy, a critique that Cassel’s favorite pupil, Gunnar Myrdal (1945, 10, quoted in
Carlson 1994, 31, n. 4), called “bitter and uncomprehending” and that Cassel’s secretary, Ingrid
Gi¨ obel-Lilja (1948, 231, quoted in Carlson 1994, 31, n. 4) described as revealing “a deep lack
of understanding, almost bordering on hatred, of Cassel’s whole personality.” Following the pub-
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considers is therefore virtually the same as Wicksell’s pure credit regime, the
onlydifferencebeingthatinsidemoneyintheformofinconvertiblebanknotes
replaces checking deposits as the sole medium of exchange.
Quantity Theory Components
Cassel provides a verbal account of all the components of the quantity theory
version of the cumulative process. Of the equations I − S = a(r − i) and
dM/dt = I − S, he says, “there exists a deﬁnite equilibrium rate of interest
[r]. If the bank rate [i] is lower than this equilibrium rate, people will go to
the bank for covering their needs for capital [I − S], and the bank will have
to issue notes [dM/dt] to meet such needs” (1928, 517).
He likewise makes it clear that the initial effect of the interest differential
is to generate a loan-created monetary expansion that occurs prior to the rise
in prices. “If the bank rate is kept too low [r − i],” he writes, “people will
ﬁnd it advantageous to borrow at the bank [LS = LD] and thus the supply
of the means of payment [dM/dt] will swell” (516). In other words, a mon-
etary overissue occurs as “the market borrows unduly much from the bank
and becomes too abundantly supplied with means of payment” (517). The
result is “an unnecessarily large issue of notes” (517) or “excessive supply
of means of payment [X]” (527)—excessive, that is, in relation to the real
demand for it, which, “without any more goods having been produced,” (517)
remains unchanged. Here is Cassel’s recognition of the excess money supply
condition X = dM/dt. Here, too, is his recognition of the corresponding ex-
cess aggregate demand and price-rise relationships E = X and dP/dt = bE.
These conditions hold, he says, when the excess money supply spills over into
the commodity market in the form of an excess demand for goods that, in the
fully employed economy, “is bound to force up prices” (517).
Application to Deﬂationary Case
Casselappliedthecumulativeprocessanalysistothesymmetricalcaseofprice
deﬂation. “If the bank rate [i] is raised above the equilibrium rate of interest
[r], the demand for loans is affected” (1928, 525). Loan demand shrinks and
with it loan supply and the nominal stock of money. The fall in the money
stock means that “the nominal purchasing power of the market is reduced”
Stockholm, where Wicksell regularly aired his views. The antipathy culminated in Cassel’s (1926;
see Ohlin [1972, 107]) declining to write an obituary article on the recently deceased Wicksell on
the grounds that “too much separated us” and that he could not in good faith give an unbiased
appraisal of a man whose “extraordinarily dogmatic” character prevented him from appreciating
Cassel’s own work and that of others. Yet this antipathy did not prevent Cassel from inadvertently
doing Wicksell—and monetary science—the supreme favor, two years after his death, of shearing
Wicksell’s cumulative process analysis of ambiguities and inconsistencies and securing it with solid
quantity-theoretic foundations. Though delayed, the drive for scientiﬁc integrity triumphed after all.74 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
belowtheunchangedrealdemandforit. Inanefforttorestoremoneybalances
totheirdesiredlevel, peoplecutbacktheirspendingforgoods“withtheresult
that prices in general must fall” (525). Through the creation of an excess
demand for money matched by an excess supply of goods, “the raising of the
bank rate above the equilibrium rate...brings about a fall in the general level
of prices,” just as “a reduction of the bank rate below the equilibrium rate,”
by generating an excess money supply, is “bound to raise the general level of
prices” (525–26).
To summarize, the foregoing constitute Cassel’s statements of the equa-
tions X = dM/dt, E = X, dP/dt = bE, and, via substitution, dP/dt =
b(dM/dt). This last equation encapsulates his acknowledgement of “the rise
in prices that must follow upon the excessive supply of means of payment”
just as the quantity theory’s postulate of money-to-price causality contends
(527).
5. CASSEL ON THE CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR PRICE
STABILITY
Cassel’s credentials as a quantity-theory interpreter of the cumulative pro-
cess manifest themselves most strongly in his discussion of the conditions
required for price stability. Like Wicksell, Cassel stressed that “stability of
prices is possible only when the bank rate is kept equal to the equilibrium
rate of interest,” that is, when the rate differential is zero (1928, 517). Far
more emphatically than Wicksell, however, he argued that not the two-rate
equality per se but rather the resulting monetary limitation is the fundamental
condition for price stability. Said he, “the purchasing power of the monetary
unit is...determined by the scarcity that the central bank chooses to give to
its note circulation” (516). Without such scarcity, “any price could be paid
and prices would continue to rise indeﬁnitely” (515). It therefore follows that
an “indispensable condition of [price] stability is...that the supply of means
of payment should be limited and thus that a certain scarcity in this supply
should exist” (515). So when the central bank brings its bank rate to equality
with the natural rate in order to “restrict its issue of notes,” it is the latter re-
strictionitselfandnottherateadjustmentthatstabilizesprices(516). Therate
adjustment, because it limits loan demands and the quantity of bank money
created as a byproduct of their accommodation, is merely the means by which
the end of price-stabilizing monetary restriction is achieved.
6. CASSEL’S REJECTION OF INTEREST COST-PUSH
THEORIES
The preceding has argued that Cassel, more so than Wicksell, established
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cumulative process. Further evidence conﬁrming Cassel’s strong adherence
to the quantity theory comes from his critique of cost-push, or more precisely
interest cost-push, theories of inﬂation.
Cost-push theories, of course, are the very antithesis of the quantity the-
ory. They attribute price inﬂation not to excess money growth, but rather to
underlying rises in factor-input prices (wages, rents, interest) that enter into
unit costs of production. These costs are then passed on to consumers in the
form of higher product prices. As a species of this genus, interest cost-push
theoriesidentifyrisesinthepriceofcapitalservicesastheinﬂationaryculprit.
AsCasselputit, theyholdthat“sincetherateofinterestisthepricefora[cap-
ital] service” that “enters into the cost of production just as the price of any
other service required in the process of production” (1928, 525), it therefore
follows “that an increase in the rate of interest is bound to increase the cost of
all products and therefore to enhance prices” (524). Cassel attributes this the-
ory to the “practical business man” who, believing that rate hikes raise prices,
“ﬁnds it very confusing when he hears a scientiﬁc economist or a representa-
tiveofacentralbankproclaimthattherateisincreasedinordertoforceprices
down” (524–25).
Fallacies of the Interest Cost-Push View
Cassel rejected the interest cost-push view on two grounds. First, it confuses
relativepriceswiththegeneral(absolute)levelofprices. Costchangesindeed
inﬂuence the former set of prices, but money supply and demand determine
thelatter. Itfollowsthatifthecentralbankkeepsthenominalsupplyofmoney
equal to the real demand for it, relative prices will move with changes in the
cost of production while aggregate prices remain unchanged. The structure
and composition of relative prices will change, but not their general average.
Second, the theory erroneously assumes wages and rents do not fall when
interest rates rise. In fact, economic logic strongly suggests that the opposite
is true. Confronted with rising interest rates, cost-minimizing producers are
likely to respond by cutting production and laying off labor and land. Own-
ers of those factor inputs, in a successful effort to keep them fully employed,
reduce their asking prices. Wages and rents fall. With capital inputs rising
in price and labor and land inputs falling in price, the upshot is clear. The
relative cost (and price) of capital-intensive goods—goods using capital rel-
atively intensively in their production—rise when interest rates rise whereas
the relative costs (and prices) of labor and land-intensive goods tend to fall.76 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Interest Cost-PushAffects Relative Prices, Not
Absolute Prices
These considerations led Cassel to argue that, provided the central bank holds
constant the stock of money per unit of real output by maintaining equality
between market and natural rates, rises in interest rates can raise the relative
prices of capital-intensive goods but not the aggregate of all prices. With
the central bank limiting the money stock, “every rise in some prices must
necessarily be counterbalanced by a fall in others” (Cassel 1928, 525). Why?
Because the higher-cost and hence dearer-priced capital-intensive goods will
require more money to be spent on their purchase leaving less for spending
on labor- and land-intensive goods whose prices will accordingly fall. In the
ﬁnal analysis, upon a matched rise in the level of market and natural interest
rates such that the money stock and aggregate spending remain unchanged,
“only those goods will rise in price for the production of which a particularly
large amount of disposal of capital has been required, whereas other prices
must sink so low that the average level of all prices remains unaltered” (525).
Here is Cassel’s contention that the aggregate price level is a monetary
phenomenon immune to matching (equilibrium) changes in the natural and
market rates of interest. Here is his claim that such rate changes, being real
phenomena, affect only relative real prices. Here too is his recognition that if
the average of all prices is kept unchanged, it follows as a matter of arithmetic
that a rise in some relative prices must be offset by a compensating fall in
others.
7. EXTENSIONS OF THE CUMULATIVE PROCESSANALYSIS
Wicksell applied the cumulative process analysis to explain price level move-
ments alone. Cassel’s active-money view of the cumulative process, however,
led him naturally to extend the analysis to examine cyclical ﬂuctuations in
realactivity, somethingWicksellwasloathtodo. Wicksellattributedbusiness
cycles to ﬂuctuations in the natural rate and its underlying real determinants
(technological progress, wars, and the like) rather than to discrepancies be-
tween that rate and the market rate. Hence, to him the cumulative process
model with its two-rate differential was irrelevant to the analysis of the cycle.
Monetary MisbehaviorAmpliﬁes Real Cycles
Cassel disagreed. He held that rate differentials and the attendant surpluses
and shortages of bank money magnify the amplitude and duration of cycles
caused by real shocks. They “very much increase the strength of the cyclical
movement of trade, with all its pernicious effects” (Cassel 1928, 528). In up-
swings, when cyclical improvements in capital productivity raise the natural
rate above the sluggishly adjusting market rate, the resulting rate differentialT. M. Humphrey: Wicksell and Cassel 77
and the excess money it creates produce too much investment compared to
the amount savers are willing to supply. The result is an unsustainable overin-
vestment boom that inevitably gives way to an underinvestment slump when
cyclical falls in capital productivity lower the natural rate below the market
rate. Clearly the monetary surpluses and shortages spawned by rate differen-
tials accentuate real cycles. If they could be removed by central bank policy
that keeps the market rate in continuous alignment with the natural rate, then,
accordingtoCassel,“thewholecyclicalmovementoftrademustbecomevery
much attenuated. For it [the cycle] will then be deprived of the great stimulus
derived from the continual falsiﬁcation of the capital market that is the con-
sequence of an alternatively too abundant and too scarce supply of means of
payment” (528).
Here was a key difference between Wicksell and Cassel. Both believed
that cycles were essentially real phenomena generated by movements in the
natural rate. But Cassel, wedded as he was to the active money view, further
believed, asWickselldidnot, thatmonetaryfactorsaugmentedrealcyclesand
rendered them more damaging than they otherwise would be. Here then was
Cassel’s justiﬁcation for using the cumulative process analysis to study trade
ﬂuctuations: it revealed how money stock surpluses and shortages emanating
fromtwo-ratedifferentialsexacerbatedrealcycles. Insodoing,itrevealedstill
another rationale for the active pursuit of monetary and price level stability:
such stability could help constrain the business cycle and keep it within the
limits dictated by real shocks and real propagation mechanisms alone.
Rejection of Non-Price-Stabilizing Policy Norms
It was on these grounds that Cassel (1928, 519–20) rejected alternative pol-
icy norms calling for (i) gently rising prices or creeping inﬂation, (ii) price
deﬂation at a rate equal to the rate of productivity growth, and (iii) cyclically
ﬂuctuatingprices. Bydepartingfromabsolutemonetaryandpricelevelstabil-
ity, such norms implied corresponding deviations between market and natural
rates of interest with all the cyclical dislocations attendant thereto.
Critique of the Gold Standard
It was also on these same grounds that Cassel (1928, 520–22) criticized the
goldstandardasamonetaryregime. Underthegoldstandard,thenation’sprice
level was determined by the following relationship: dollar price of goods (the
price level) equals ﬁxed dollar price of gold times worldwide gold price of
goods. By permitting movements in the worldwide gold price of goods—
movements virtually guaranteed by dissimilar ﬂuctuations in the respective
growth rates of gold and goods—to pass through to corresponding move-
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instability and the disruptions it would bring. Little wonder that Cassel, un-
convincedashewasthatfoolproofwayscouldbefoundtopreventﬂuctuations
in the world gold price of goods from affecting national price levels, recom-
mendedabolishingthegoldstandardforarationalpaperstandardadministered
by the central bank.
8. CASSELAND WICKSELL ON THE FEEDBACK POLICY
RULE
A rational money standard works only as well as the rule or norm the central
bank employs in conducting policy. Both Wicksell and Cassel thought that
the theoretically ideal policy rule was for the central bank to maintain its bank
rate in continuous equality with the natural rate. But both also believed that
such a rule was infeasible because it required knowledge of the natural rate,
seen by them as an unobservable variable that is impossible to target.
Still, both men contended that the bank could target the price level even
though it could never directly target the unobservable natural rate. It could
determine from movements in the price level whether the bank rate was too
low or too high relative to the natural rate and thus needed adjustment. As
Cassel put it, since “it is impossible for the central bank to know exactly what
this ‘natural rate’is” (1928, 528), the “only practical way of ascertaining what
is the correct bank rate is, therefore, by observing the results. If prices are
seen to rise continuously, the bank may be sure that the rate is too low. Vice
versa, when prices fall, the bank may conclude that the rate is too high” (518).
Cassel’s Statement of the Rule
FromtheseconsiderationsCasselderivedhisversionoftheWicksellianpolicy
rule: “The bank has to adjust its rate so that no general tendency either to a
rise or to a fall in prices arises. The practical rule is, therefore, that the bank
rate should be so adjusted as to keep the general level of prices as constant as
possible” (1928, 512).
Cassel’s rule, however, lacks the precision of Wicksell’s. In the latter
rule, the bank rate adjusts in response to price deviations from target, and the
response continues until prices roll back to their pre-inﬂation or pre-deﬂation
levels. By contrast, Cassel’s rule is hardly that speciﬁc. It says only that
the rate must be manipulated to hold prices constant. It fails to specify the
indicatorvariable—namelypricedeviationsfromtargetP −PT—towhichthe
central bank responds. And it fails to note that the response must be sustained
until prices return to target.
Cassel’s imprecise formulation of the policy rule prevented him from
seeing what Wicksell understood implicitly, namely that the rule can at best
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point in time. It can constrain their ﬂuctuations within a narrow band about
target, but it cannot continually keep them at target.
Dynamic Stability-of-EquilibriumAnalysisApplied to
Wicksell’s Rule
Wicksell’s conclusion—that a feedback policy rule linking bank rate adjust-
ments to price level deviations from target can at best deliver price stability on
average—emerges from a stability-of-equilibrium analysis performed on the
modelpresentedearlierinthearticle. AlthoughthereisnoevidencethatWick-
sellhimselfperformedthisanalysis, itisusefultodosohere. First, reducethe
rule-constrainedcumulativeprocessmodeltotwodifferentialequations. One,
dP/dt = a(r − i), states that prices adjust linearly to the natural rate–bank
rate differential. The other, di/dt = g(P − PT), states that the central bank
adjusts its rate di/dt in a ﬁxed proportion g to price level deviations from tar-
get P −PT. Here, of course, the natural rate r and price target PT are treated
as given, ﬁxed constants, the natural rate having attained its predetermined
level from a prior real shock.
Second, form the Jacobian matrix of the partial derivatives of the differ-
ential equations. This two-by-two matrix has as elements 0 and −a in the ﬁrst
row and g and 0 in the second.
Third, observe that the matrix possesses a zero trace and a positive deter-
minantag. Thesetwoconditions, wellknownfromstabilityanalysis, indicate
that the price level oscillates ceaselessly about target at an amplitude that de-
pends upon the magnitudes of the adjustment parameters a and g.
Wicksell, of course, intuitively understood this result. He maintained that
his feedback rule, if implemented, could deliver approximate stability in the
sense of constraining price level ﬂuctuations within a narrow band of plus
and minus 3 percent about target (Uhr 1991, 94). Evidently such modest
perpetual overshooting of the price level target bothered him not in the least.
Had it bothered him, he might have modiﬁed his rule slightly to prevent such
ceaseless overshooting and to ensure that prices eventually converge to target
either monotonically or via damped oscillatory paths.
Wicksell’s RuleAugmented
The modiﬁcation in question calls for the central bank to adjust its interest
rate in response both to price level deviations from target and to the rate of
change (time derivative) of the price level according to the augmented rule
di/dt = g(P − PT) + h(dP/dt). Adding this last term to the reduced-form
model’s rate-adjustment equation yields a Jacobian with a negative trace −ha
and a positive determinant ag. Both are required to ensure price convergence
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Thismodiﬁedruleseemseminentlyreasonable. Certainlycentralbankers,
if charged with the duty of stabilizing prices, would respond to price level
changes dP/dt as well as to price level gaps P − PT. For just as a pilot
landing a jumbo jet must heed his plane’s vertical distance from the runway
and its speed of approach lest it descend too rapidly and crash, so too must
the central bank watch the gap between actual and target prices and the rate of
price change lest it overshoot its target. Aside from this oversight, however,
Wicksell’s understanding of the feedback rule must be judged superior to
Cassel’s.
Bank RateAffects Money Stock, WhichAffects Price
Level
Still, on one point at least Cassel outshoneWicksell. Cassel made it clear that
the bank rate operates to stabilize prices not directly but indirectly, through
the money stock. Bank rate adjustment affects the demand for and supply of
loans and the quantity of money created as an offshoot of the loans. Changes
in the money stock then restore prices to target. The rate is the central bank’s
instrument variable, the money stock its intermediate variable, and the price
level its goal variable. In Cassel’s own words, “the purchasing power of the
monetary unit” is “determined by the scarcity the central bank chooses to give
to its note circulation” (1928, 516). And “the ultimate and essential means”
whereby “it is able to restrict its issue of notes” is “the bank rate” (516).
Causation runs from bank rate to money supply to price level.
The signiﬁcance of Cassel’s contribution is this: it implies that money
maybecrucialtotheworkingsofmonetarypolicyeveninmodelsthatexclude
money from their equations. Wicksell, of course, had constructed just such a
model. The cumulative process and policy rule equations of his model omit
money and instead have interest rate adjustments alone moving prices. They
give the impression that the behavior of the quantity of money is essentially a
sideshow, irrelevant to the operation of the policy rule. Cassel’s work implies
that this impression is wrong. Although he failed to write down a formal,
price-stabilizing policy rule, Cassel instinctively understood that the quantity
theory underlies such a rule just as it does the cumulative process. If so, then
money plays a role even in Wicksell’s moneyless model. Money is crucial to
the workings of the model because it translates rate changes and differentials
into price level changes.
9. CONCLUSION
Anti-quantity and quantity theory interpretations vie in modern readings of
Wicksell’s cashless-economy model of the cumulative process. And for good
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passages allude to quantity-theoretic money-to-price causality, others to anti-
quantity theoretic reverse, price-to-money causality. Moreover, he explicitly
states the anti-quantity theory notion of a passive, demand-determined stock
of inside money. Believing that such money can never be in excess supply,
he fails to apply real balance mechanics to it to explain why people attempt
to rid themselves of it by spending it away and so force a rise in prices. His
pure credit economy case differs from his pure cash and mixed cash-credit
economy cases in which the quantity theory always plays a dominant role.
His inconsistency is easily explained. As a pioneering monetary theorist,
he was engaged in pathbreaking work of the highest order. Operating in new
and unfamiliar territory, he was forging a complex analysis that combined
elements of capital theory, price theory, production and distribution theory,
and monetary theory. Involved as he was in this ambitious and far-reaching
project, he could hardly be expected to state every nuance with the precision,
clarity, and consistency that later scholars well acquainted with his analysis
could give it. In any case, he failed to convey his intentions as clearly as one
mighthavewished. Insodoing,heleftthedooropenforsomeofhissuccessors
to give his cumulative process analysis anti-quantity theory interpretations.
It remained for Gustav Cassel, writing 30 years after the publication of
Wicksell’sInterestandPrices,andfullycognizantofwhatWicksellhadsought
to accomplish, to express matters clearly and to articulate the active money
view. Insodoing,heestablishedforalltimethequantity-theoreticfoundations
of the Wicksellian triumvirate: pure credit economy, cumulative process, and
stabilizing policy rule. He showed that an endogenous, loan-created stock
of bank money was essential to translate interest rate differentials into price
level changes in the pure credit economy. Likewise, he established that bank
rate adjustments work through money stock changes to stabilize prices in the
operationofthefeedbackpolicyrule. Inshort,hecompletedtheworkWicksell
had started 30 years before.
Unfortunately, Cassel’s contributions to cumulative process analysis and
to the theory of stabilizing policy rules have gone largely unnoticed. Few cite
his1928QJE articlefeaturingthosecontributions. Citationsinsteadaremade
to his Theory of Social Economy in which the contributions are missing. He
is remembered today for (i) his purchasing power parity theory of exchange
rates, (ii) his simpliﬁed version of the Walrasian system of general equilib-
rium,aversionstrippedofWalras,mathematics,marginalutility,andmarginal
productivity, (iii) his empirical claim that the differential growth rates of the
gold stock and real output determine the path of the price level, and (iv) his
theory that the limited life span (interest earning period) of savers sets a ﬂoor
to interest rates. It is clear that he also deserves equal credit for establishing
quantity theory foundations for policy rules and the cumulative process. Had
Cassel’ssuccessorsbeenmorefullyawareofhisworkinthisarea, subsequent
interpretations ofWicksell’s monetary constructs might have taken a different82 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
turn. In any case, Cassel’s rediscovered insights, highlighting as they do the
originalityandexplanatorypowerofWicksell’sanalyticalmodel, conﬁrmand
underscore Wicksell’s place in the pantheon of monetary theorists.
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